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Background: Global Health Initiatives (GHIs), aiming at reducing the impact of specific diseases such as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), have flourished since 2000. Amongst these, PEPFAR and GFATM have provided a
substantial amount of funding to countries affected by HIV, predominantly for delivery of antiretroviral therapy
(ARV) and prevention strategies. Since the need for additional human resources for health (HRH) was not initially
considered by GHIs, countries, to allow ARV scale-up, implemented short-term HRH strategies, adapted to
GHI-funding conditionality. Such strategies differed from one country to another and slowly evolved to long-term
HRH policies. The processes and content of HRH policy shifts in 5 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were examined.
Methods: A multi-country study was conducted from 2007 to 2011 in 5 countries (Angola, Burundi, Lesotho,
Mozambique and South Africa), to assess the impact of GHIs on the health system, using a mixed methods design.
This paper focuses on the impact of GFATM and PEPFAR on HRH policies. Qualitative data consisted of
semi-structured interviews undertaken at national and sub-national levels and analysis of secondary data from
national reports. Data were analysed in order to extract countries’ responses to HRH challenges posed by
implementation of HIV-related activities. Common themes across the 5 countries were selected and compared in
light of each country context.
Results: In all countries successful ARV roll-out was observed, despite HRH shortages. This was a result of mostly
short-term emergency response by GHI-funded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and to a lesser extent by
governments, consisting of using and increasing available HRH for HIV tasks. As challenges and limits of short-term
HRH strategies were revealed and HIV became a chronic disease, the 5 countries slowly implemented mid to
long-term HRH strategies, such as formalisation of pilot initiatives, increase in HRH production and mitigation of
internal migration of HRH, sometimes in collaboration with GHIs.
Conclusion: Sustainable HRH strengthening is a complex process, depending mostly on HRH production and
retention factors, these factors being country-specific. GHIs could assist in these strategies, provided that they are
flexible enough to incorporate country-specific needs in terms of funding, that they coordinate at global-level and
minimise conditionality for countries.
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In the early 2000s the international community responded
to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) pandemic,
in addition to re-emerging Tuberculosis (TB) and on-going
malaria epidemics, by creating targeted disease-specific
funding mechanisms, termed Global Health Initiatives
(GHIs). Among those funding for HIV control were the U.S.
President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GFATM) and the Multicountry AIDS Program of the
World Bank (MAP) [1]. GHIs were defined as “a blue-
print for financing, resourcing, coordinating, and/or imple-
menting disease control across at least several countries in
more than one region in the world” [2], pp. 74. GFATM
and PEPFAR allocated most funds to antiretroviral (ARV)
provision [3,4], which was the most pressing need at
country-level at that time, without considering human
capacity to deliver these ARVs.
Rapid expansion of HIV programmes in Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) suddenly revealed the demand for human re-
sources for health (HRH) in a continent already depleted
of HRH [5,6]. HRH demand was not only quantitative, in
terms of the scale-up of labour-intensive service-delivery to
hundreds of thousands of newly diagnosed patients, but
also qualitative, in terms of new skills needed to manage
patients with HIV [7]. SSA was faced with a double chal-
lenge in relation to HRH, a structural deficit and an ac-
quired shortage. The World Health Organization (WHO)
had estimated that 2.3 qualified health workers per 1,000
population – 0.55 physicians and 1.88 nurses/midwives -
were the minimum, needed to ensure the delivery of 80%
of basic services [5]. This minimum threshold, which varies
in relation to the epidemiological profile and the productiv-
ity of staff, was far from being achieved in most the coun-
tries in SSA at the time GHIs launched their activities.
The distorting effects of HIV funding on countries’
health systems, including effects on HRH, were being re-
ported from soon after the launch of GHIs: PEPFAR, by
channelling their funding through international implemen-
ters and GFATM, by implementing their activities through
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were
responsible for “poaching” staff from an already depleted
public sector; in many sites, specific units for HIV patients
were created in public facilities around a doctor-centred
model of ARV provision, fragmenting the health system;
and the skills needed for HIV management were initially
developed in standalone programmes and in an uncoordin-
ated fashion, mostly through in-service trainings [8-13].
Such country-level findings, which were often based on
key informant interviews at the national level, brought the
HRH issue to the attention of global stakeholders and be-
came incorporated into the “health systems strengthening”
global agenda. This was evidenced by a number of glo-
bal initiatives on HRH which multiplied during the lastdecade: Joint Learning Initiative [14], World health Re-
port [5], Global Health Workforce Alliance, Japanese
International Cooperation Agency’s commitment to
train additional health workers, renewal of interest in
Community-Health Workers and Mid-Level Workers,
WHO global plan to “treat, train and retain” HRH [15].
At country-level, a number of innovative approaches
and new policies, different in nature according to the
context, were also developed in response to the aggra-
vated HRH crisis.
This paper provides an analysis of both short-term
and long-term HRH responses to implementation of
PEPFAR and GFATM funded activities, in 5 countries in
SSA. It draws on health policy and system research, an
approach born from the necessity to analyse systematic-
ally globalized and complex health systems.Methods
A five year multi-country study (2007–2011), funded by
the European Commission was conducted in 5 countries
in SSA (Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique and
South Africa), to describe and analyse the effects of
GHIs on country health systems. GHIs common to all 5
countries were PEPFAR (except Burundi), MAP (except
South Africa) and GFATM. MAP was excluded from the
study since not all countries could collect data related to
it. The research focused mainly on countries’ responses
to the increased demand on HRH due to the challenges
posed by GHI-funded HIV activities.
The research design was a mixed methods approach,
based on a conceptual framework developed to analyse the
influence of external aid on countries’ health policy and
systems. Tools for quantitative and qualitative data collec-
tion were jointly developed by the multi-country team,
covering the 6 building blocks of the health system [13].
Details on each country’s method for data collection
and analysis are presented in Table 1. Ethical approval
and permission to conduct research were obtained from
relevant authorities in all countries prior to data collec-
tion. Sampling, from provinces down to facilities, was
done by each country team, and finalised following con-
sultation with relevant authorities.
Qualitative data consisted of document review and
semi-structured interviews, conducted at different levels
of the health system. A first group of respondents was se-
lected according to their relevance to the topic researched
and thereafter more were recruited using the snowball
technique. A total of 145 interviews at national-level and
419 at sub-national level were conducted in the 5 coun-
tries. National-level interviews included key-informant
interviews at national and sub-national levels and of devel-
opment partners (international and local) and government
officials.
Table 1 Methods used and details of data collection and analysis in each country
Angola Burundi Lesotho Mozambique SA
Ethics
approval
National and provincial
health authorities
National ethics
committee
Ethics committee of the
Ministry of Health and
Social Welfare
National bioethics
committee
National, provincial and
municipal government
research committees,
UWC ethics committee
Period of
data
collection
2009 April-June 2009 February- June 2008 July- 2009 February 2007 March- September;
2008
2008 September −2010
October
2010 May 2011 March- June 2010 February-May
2011 June-September
Language
of data
collection
Portuguese French / Kirundi English Portuguese and English English, Xhosa, Afrikaans,
Zulu
Number
and type of
interviews
National level: Ministry of
Health (minister, advisors
from the Ministry of
Health / PAV-MINSA
“immunization program”),
and offices of selected
Implementing Partners
(UNICEF, ONUSIDA, EU,
WHO) and NGOs 11 in
2009 1 in 2010
National level: MoH
officials (senior
managers, HRH/
planning/ programs
managers), National AIDS
Council secretariat, NGOs
representatives, GHIs
representatives 27 in
2009 26 in 2011
National level : in-depth
key informant interviews
with 22 representatives
of the government,
bilateral and multilateral
development agencies
and other stakeholders at
the national level
National level: 21 in 2008;
Ministry of Health (MoH)
officials, offices of
selected Implementing
Partners (WHO, UNAIDS,
UNICEF, Irish Aid, PMI/
CDC, World Bank, USAID,
CDC, DFID) and NGOs
(MONASO-network of
national NGOs working
on AIDS, Malaria
Consortium, Health
Alliance International
National level: MoH
officials, SANAC,
international NGO
coordinators,
international health
agencies coordinators 19
in 2008–2009 18 in 2010
Sub-national level:
provincial government
officers, NGOs, district
managers, facility
managers 30 in 2011
Sub-national level:
provincial government
officers, provincial AIDS
committee, NGOs,
district managers, facility
managers and
employees 35 in 2009 45
in 2011
Sub-national level:
around 60 with provincial
and district health
directorates, HR
managers, NGO
managers, individuals in
charge of health facilities
and services responsible
in 2010
Sub-national levels:
Provincial and municipal
governments, sub-
provincial management
levels (general manager,
HR manager, finance
manager) N = 105 from
2009 to 2010
Facility and NGO level:
NGO representative,
health workers, facility
manager N = 144
Type of
documents
analyzed
National health policy,
national programs of
Malaria, Tuberculosis and
Maternal Health and
national and international
reports; Published
literature and
unpublished documents
provided by key
informants of MINSA,
national and international
NGOs, Provincial Health
Department and
Municipal Hospitals.
Policy and planning
documents from
programs and HRH unit,
national health plan,
proposals for GHIs
Review of Lesotho’s
Round 5 Grant Score
Cards Grant Performance
reports and policy and
planning documents
from programs and HRH
unit, national plan : 10-15
Policy and planning
documents from National
programs and HR
National Directorate,
national health plan, grey
documents
Policy and planning
documents from national
department of health,
grey documents,
proposals for GHIs, draft
policies
Quantitative
sampling
method
(sub-national
level
NA 3 provinces (2 rural and
one urban, in each of
which 3 or 4 facilities
(NGO, private and public)
were selected (14 in
2009 and 12 in 2011)
NA NA 3 provinces, minimum of
2 districts in each,
minimum of two facilities
in each district at lowest
level providing ART
initiation. Rural/urban
sampling where possible
at each level
Type of
quantitative
data
HRH national report and
national HIV program
report for ART patients
figures
Survey at facility level
(N = 105 in 2009, N = 78
in 2011) to health workers
(salary level, incentives,
trainings, supervision)
NA Surveys at facility level for
HRH, infrastructures
mapping, health
information system, and
pharmacy information;
Health system trust
database for HRH data;
National ART report for
ART patients number
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Table 1 Methods used and details of data collection and analysis in each country (Continued)
surveys for NGO
mapping and district
health services network
Surveys at facility level
for HRH number and
trainings, surveys for
NGO mapping and
district health services
network
HRH national review and
national HIV program
report for ART patients
figures
Analysis
method
(software
used)
Qualitative data: Thematic
analysis - analyzed
manually
Qualitative data:
Framework analysis using
Atlas.ti for
Qualitative data:
Framework analysis using
Atlas.ti
Qualitative data:
Thematic analysis using
Nvivo and content
analysis
Qualitative data:
Thematic analysis both
manually and using
Atlas.ti
Quantitative data:
analyzed using Stata
(version 8)
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scribed, translated when needed and coded. Written
consent form was obtained prior to each interview. Data
in each country were analysed by country teams, consti-
tuted of at least 2 researchers, using thematic analysis,
done either manually or with software. Annual work-
shops were conducted to discuss data collection chal-
lenges and preliminary findings, to allow triangulation of
data and to identify relevant common themes.
Quantitative data consisted of surveys at facility level
and secondary data from government information sys-
tems. Two categories of HRH in the public sector
were considered for quantitative data: medical doctors
and professional nurses (basic/intermediate/specialized
levels). Other categories, such as pharmacists and com-
munity health workers were not homogeneous enough
across countries to allow comparisons, or data were
missing which precluded cross-country comparisons.
Specialist doctors were merged with general medical
doctors. Nurse and midwife figures were merged when
possible to allow comparisons with the health worker
threshold above cited [5].
We provided quantitative data on evolution of num-
bers of HRH in the public sector (2004–2010) and on
ARV roll-out (2004–2009).
This paper first presents and compares background
data on each country, followed by the short-term HRH
strategies adopted and challenges they posed. The paper
then examines countries’ transitions from a short-term
strategy to long-term HRH policy, as HIV became a
chronic disease. Short term strategies were defined as
strategies implemented by local stakeholders without a
formal regulatory framework, mostly via internal ar-
rangement. Long-term policies were defined as those
backed-up by an official authority and a regulatory
framework, allowing standardization and sustainability.
We finally discuss similarities and differences in strat-
egies and policies across countries, in light of their con-
text and more generally, the HRH strengthening needs
and the role of GHIs.Results
Country contexts
Relevant features of the 5 countries studied are presented
in Table 2. All 5 countries now have democratically elected
governments, though most are relatively new multi-party
democracies, including South Africa and Mozambique
(1994) and Burundi (2005). Burundi gained independence
in the 1960s, whereas Angola and Mozambique did so in
1975. These 3 countries have experienced civil wars,
Mozambique just after its independence and more re-
cently Angola and Burundi. In terms of demography,
Burundi is an outlier, with 318 inhabitants per km2,
whereas other countries’ densities range from 15 to 71 per
km2. South Africa is an upper-middle income country,
Lesotho and Angola are lower-middle income countries
and Mozambique and Burundi are low-income countries
(World Bank classification 2009). The position of the 5
countries within this classification was correlated with the
amount of Official Aid for Development as % of Gross Na-
tional Income: Burundi and Mozambique are the 2 coun-
tries most dependent on external aid.
In terms of burden of HIV, Lesotho and South Africa
carry the heaviest ones, with, in 2009, an antenatal HIV
prevalence of 23.6% and 17.8% respectively. South Africa’s
larger population meant it had more than 5.5 million
HIV-infected people in 2009 and almost half a million
cases of TB diagnosed in 2010. Angola and Burundi have
the lowest incidence of TB (304 and 129 cases per 100,000
inhabitants respectively in 2010) and HIV prevalence (3.3
and 2% respectively in 2009). Angola, Burundi and
Mozambique have the worst indicators for maternal and
child health.
With regard to health financing, all governments spent
in 2009 from 8 to 13% of their total expenditure on the
health sector; this percentage included funding from ex-
ternal sources. The latter represents as much as 72% for
Mozambique, 45% in Burundi, and 30% in Lesotho, but
only 3 and 2% for Angola and South Africa respectively.
If external sources of funding are excluded, government
expenditure on health would drop significantly in the 4
Table 2 Summary of socio-economic and health related indicators for the 6 countries included in the analysis
Angola Burundi Lesotho Mozambique South
Africa
Significant historic features Independence 1975 Independence
1962
Independence1966 Independence:
1975
Apartheid
1948-1994
Quarter century of
civil war: 1975 - 2002
Cyclic civil
wars since
1963
Several military coups with latest
handover to democratic government in
1995
Civil war: 1976-
1992
Latest: 1993-
2006
Population density/km2 15 318 71 29 41
Net ODA as% of GNI 0.3 42.3 5.4 20.8 0.4
GDP in current USD per capita 4069 163 800 428 5733
Public health expenditure, as % of
total government expenditure
8 12 8 13 9
External resources for health, % of
total expenditure for health
3 45 30 72 2
OOP expenditure on health, % of
total expenditure for health
11 36 22 12 18
GINI coefficient (latest available) 58.6 (2000) 33.3 (2006) 52.5 (2003) 47.1 (2003) 67.4 (2006)
Human Development Index
ranking 2011 (out of 187
countries)
148 185 160 184 123
HIV prevalence 15–49 years old, %
(2009)
2 3.3 23.6 11.5 17.8
Number of persons affected by
HIV, all ages, 2009
200,000 180,000 290,000 1,400,000 5,600,000
TB incidence, per 100,000
inhabitants, 2010
304 129 633 544 981
Number of TB cases detected,
2010
58,000 11,000 14,000 130,000 490,000
Malaria mortality rate per 100,000
inhabitants, 2008
89 39 0.1 171 0.2
Under-five mortality rate, per 1,000
live births, 2010
161 142 85 135 57
Maternal mortality ratio per
100,000 live births, 2008
610 970 530 550 410
GFATM-HIV, cumulative
disbursement, as of 2011, millions
USD
62.2 69.5 91.8 168.7 247.6
GFATM-malaria, disbursed, as of
2011, millions USD
62.0 55.2 0 61.6 0
GFATM-TB, disbursed, as of 2011,
millions USD
10.3 9.8 10.7 12.6 0
PEPFAR, disbursed, as of 2009,
millions USD ( + committed 2010)
47.7 0 (Not eligible) 96.2 1096.7 3113.4
MAP1 World Bank, committed,
millions USD
21 51 (with
MAP2)
5 55 0
Sources:
Socio-economic and finance indicators; World Bank database, 2009.
Health indicators: WHO global health indicators database.
Disbursements indicators: GFATM website, PEPFAR country-websites, World Bank MAP-country websites.
Human development index: UNDP.
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total government expenditure.
The health system organization is typically pyramidal in
all countries, with a centrally managed district-based sys-
tem. In Burundi, decision-making remains very centralized
at national level, especially budget allocation, since the dis-
trict health system is very recent. In South Africa, the na-
tional level plays a normative role, by drafting policies and
allocating funding, while provinces have considerable au-
tonomy and exhibit variation. In Angola, the national level
has a normative role and since 2007, municipal health au-
thorities are in charge of district health management (in-
cluding budget allocation) and planning. In Mozambique
and in Lesotho, the decentralization process has been
gradual. In Mozambique, provinces gained autonomy,
while budget allocation is still centralized. All countries
have HRH development policies and plans, but their level
of ownership and sophistication varies: South Africa’s plan
is relatively detailed with projections of HRH until 2025
[16]; Mozambique’s is clearly articulated with MDGs and
aligned with other policies but lacks funding (National
Plan for HRH Development 2008–2015; National Direct-
orate of Human Resources, Ministry of Health, 2008);
whereas Burundi launched its first plan only in 2010 [17];
Lesotho’s HRH policy is clearly articulated with the Health
and Social Welfare Policy (2004) which ensures appropri-
ate supply, and properly trained personnel to meet the
needs of the country and also ensures career development.
In terms of HRH quantity, all countries except South
Africa have experienced a general HRH deficit [18]. How-
ever, these figures are aggregates, neglecting the break-
down between public and private for profit (PFP) staff. In
South Africa, the PFP sector is favoured by physicians,
with 59% of them working in this sector in 2010, while
serving only 15% of the population [19]. In the other 4
countries, the PFP sector is not so prominent, though its
assessment is difficult, since many HRH working in theFigure 1 Evolution of selected HRH indicators in the public sector, in thpublic sector are in dual practice, undertaking a parallel
PFP activity. If only the public sector is considered and the
threshold of 2.3 health workers (0.55 doctors and 1.88
nurses and midwives per 1,000 population) applied, all 5
countries have unmet needs, both in 2004 and 2010
(Figure 1). The extent of unmet needs in the public sector
varies, with the lowest density of physicians and pro-
fessional nurses in Burundi and Mozambique, whereas
Angola has a shortage of physicians and has nurses in ex-
cess (though most of them have only basic level education)
when compared to the WHO threshold.
Since at least 2004, all 5 countries have been receiving
funding from the 3 GHIs (GFATM, PEPFAR -except for
Burundi- and the World Bank MAP -except for South
Africa-).The amounts disbursed by PEPFAR greatly out-
weighed those of GFATM and MAP, especially in South
Africa and Mozambique (Table 2), much of it for ARV
roll-out. Lesotho was not a focus-country for PEPFAR
and Burundi was not eligible for PEPFAR until 2011. In
terms of subsequent ARV roll-out, the increase in the
number of patients on ARV was dramatic in all 5 coun-
tries between 2004 and 2009 (Table 3), despite the sus-
tained deficit in HRH (Figure 1). The majority of
patients were enrolled for ARV in the public sector, ex-
cept for Burundi where the majority were initially en-
rolled in stand-alone HIV-clinics run by local NGOs.
Data from our study showed that this successful ARV
roll-out, despite a HRH deficit in these countries, was a
result of adaptive practices, which occurred in a similar
way in all countries: initially, a short-term emergency re-
sponse mostly by GHI-funded NGOs and to a lesser ex-
tent by government; then, challenges related to this
emergency-type response increased and, as HIV became
a chronic disease, government started to formulate and
implement long-term policies, sometimes in collabor-
ation with GHIs. This 2-step country-response is de-
tailed below.e 5 countries, between 2004 and 2010.
Table 3 Numbers of patients on ARV in 2004 and 2009 in the 5 countries
Year Angola Burundi Lesotho Mozambique South Africa
2004 (unless otherwise specified) 5,357 1,200 54,237 8,010 32,895 (2005)
2009 (unless otherwise specified) 20,640 17,500 (2010) 92,773 (2008) 134,147 781,465
Sources:
Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique: national HIV program reports.
SA: ART factsheet from national department of health.
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Using the pool of available HRH for HIV tasks
Informal or formal task-shifting at facility-level In all
countries except Angola, task-shifting (to less skilled
HRH or to lay health workers) occurred at facility-level
for HIV clinical management. In South Africa, it was
mainly an initiative of international NGOs, first infor-
mally by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), during the
period of HIV denialism in the government [20],
followed by GHI-funded NGOs. In Burundi, informal
task-shifting was in place in rural areas since before the
civil war, because of pre-existing doctors’ shortage. How-
ever, task-shifting for HIV was not considered initially.
More recently, informal initiatives with follow-up of
ARV patients by nurses were conducted as pilots, mostly
by GFATM-supported NGOs. In Mozambique, the Min-
istry of Health adopted HIV task-shifting policy early on:
formal non-physician clinicians pre-dated the GHIs era
and have been further trained for ARV prescription; also,
in some rural facilities, nurses were trained to follow-up
pre-ARV patients. In Lesotho, task-shifting has always
been supported by the government. Nurses in the rural
areas have always worked under a written protocol by
the district medical officer. This has been extended to
HIV/AIDS; nurses have been trained further to initiate
ARV treatment in uncomplicated cases.
Challenges: In South Africa, facility-level task-shifting
was well accepted locally but remained for a while as
scattered pilot projects; and its scale-up was slow, due to
a lack of formal process and standardization and an ac-
tive opposition from professional councils. In Burundi,
its uptake was slow, mainly due to some resistance to
change from professional bodies as well as from patients,
since HIV was considered a complex disease. In
Mozambique and Lesotho, where task-shifting was oper-
ating historically since before GHIs, its adaptation to in-
clude HIV activities was easier.
Allocation of HIV-tasks to specific health workers In
all countries except Angola, specific units for HIV services
opened in public facilities. Separation of HIV and non-
HIV activities aimed at tighter management of external
funding and at training a limited number of HRH. New
staff were recruited or staff formerly present were intern-
ally redeployed to work in these units. Sometimes one staff
member was allocated to HIV-specific tasks within thesame unit (e.g. Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmis-
sion -PMTCT- in Maternal and Child Unit).
Challenges: In the short-term, this system allowed imple-
mentation of urgent and specific activities but proved un-
sustainable in the medium-term. Indeed, the numbers of
specific HRH needed (clinical as well as administrative)
had to be increased exponentially, in parallel to patient
numbers. In Mozambique, this stand-alone approach was
discontinued in 2007 and HIV services were progressively
integrated into the public health sector. Also, except in
South Africa, staff within these specific HIV units and in
some cases staff allocated to specific HIV tasks within
the same unit received supplementary stipends out of
GFATM-HIV grant. These practices induced team divisions
and tended to undermine mainstreaming of HIV activities.
Increasing the pool of HRH for HIV tasks
Use of retired staff (only in Lesotho) Retired nurses
are used as mentors for PMTCT (by international
NGOs) - administration of that program is being moved
to the government with local mentors being paid by the
government. This strategy has worked because Lesotho
was in dire shortage of nurses and utilized available and
experienced staff. The biggest challenge was the remu-
neration while nurses were transferred back to govern-
ment, since international NGOs paid more than the
government.
Stand-alone GHI funded NGOs for HIV-activities In
the case of PEPFAR and GFATM, NGOs delivering
HIV-care were either direct or indirect recipients of
funding, as disbursement through civil society was a
conditionality to get their funding [21,22]. In all coun-
tries, local NGOs were mainly funded by GFATM
whereas PEPFAR implementers, who subcontracted to
local NGOs, were often U.S.-based. In Burundi and
Mozambique, GHI implementing agencies, separate
from government, were created. In Burundi, these agen-
cies also funded local NGOs and some of these in turn
created HIV-clinics, run independently from govern-
mental institutions. In all countries, GHI-funded NGOs
offered higher salaries than the public sector, allowing
them to attract more qualified staff. In Burundi, on
average, GFATM-funded NGO staff was paid 2 to 3
times more than in the public sector at the time of the
survey at facility-level (quantitative data, 2009). In
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reported that PEPFAR implementers provided much
higher salaries than GFATM-funded NGOs.
Challenges: All countries faced an internal brain-drain
of experienced staff from the public sector to GHI-
funded NGOs, due to differences in salary level. In
Burundi and Lesotho, migration was also observed from
the public sector to the National AIDS Council (NAC)
secretariat, where management staff received higher
salaries than in the public sector.
HIV staff seconded to facilities - (in South Africa only)
A number of PEPFAR implementers were allowed by
government to second staff to public sector HIV clinics,
to help them with accreditation and to then hand over
the clinic to the facility in which they were located. In
one province, GFATM-funded HRH, dedicated to HIV,
were placed at facility level and directly managed by the
provincial department of health.
Challenges: Clinical staff, paid by PEPFAR implemen-
ters and seconded to facilities, were officially paid at the
same rate as public sector staff, as a result of internal ar-
rangement, but had higher net incomes as government
benefits were not automatically deducted, incurring
some resentment from the rest of the staff. The vertical
management system of GFATM created confusion and
undermined integration. Concerns around whether these
seconded staff would be absorbed by the public sector
were being raised, as GHI funding began declining.
Informal task-shifting at community-level In all coun-
tries, Community Health Workers (CHWs) existed before
the GHI era. In South Africa, CHWs were further re-
cruited and trained, mostly by local NGOs subsidized by
GFATM grants, to provide prevention and promotion
activities on HIV at community level. In Burundi,
Mozambique and Lesotho, new cadres of health workers
called “health mediators”, “lay counsellors” or “expert-
patients” were introduced through funding from GHIs,
dedicated exclusively to HIV-related activities [23]. Their
training has been provided by GHI-funded NGOs
(Lesotho). After their training, they receive short-term
contracts with NGOs or hospitals, working under the
supervision of NGOs and receiving GHI-funded stipends.
Challenges: In contrast to implementation of task-
shifting at facility-level, community-level task-shifting
worked well, since it preceded the emergence of the
GHIs and did not interfere with existing power and hier-
archies amongst professional HRH. However, in
Burundi, the curricula of the new cadres of HRH
remained ‘unofficial’ rendering their situation precarious.
“Health mediators” were left unpaid for months, due to
confusion during the transition between 2 GFATM
rounds [24]. The lack of harmonization of trainingsamongst different training providers was also a concern
in all countries.
HIV as a chronic disease: towards long-term policies
Formalisation of pilot initiatives
Regulatory framework for task-shifting at facility-
level Informal task-shifting was followed by attempts to
legitimise expanded professional responsibilities and to
standardize practices. In South Africa, the government
authorized formal nurse-initiated antiretroviral therapy
[25], after the STRETCH (Streamlining Tasks and Roles
to Expand Treatment and Care for HIV) trial demon-
strated the safety of such a policy [26]. In Burundi in
2008, a ministerial circular authorized nurses to pre-
scribe ARV, though under the supervision of a medical
doctor. In Mozambique and Lesotho, where task-shifting
pre-dated GHIs, scopes of practice of non-physician cli-
nicians and nurses were officially expanded, with HIV
training provided by PEPFAR and international imple-
menting partners (e.g. International Training & Educa-
tion Centre for Health in Mozambique).
Official creation of new cadre of health workers Two
new cadres of health professionals were officially created
in South Africa in 2008 with their job description re-
leased by national level through a circular in 2010
[27,28]. The curriculum of one of them, called clinical
associates, includes also HIV management and is par-
tially supported by PEPFAR (funding of HIV/AIDS twin-
ning centre partnerships with US institutions). A
middle-level pharmacy cadre, called pharmacists' assis-
tants, has also been created, with some initial resistance
from the pharmaceutical bodies. CHWs are recognized
in South Africa as having significantly supported ARV
roll-out. With the latest, far-reaching reforms in South
Africa, known as 'Primary Health Care (PHC) re-
engineering’, CHWs are now being integrated into so-
called “ward-based PHC outreach teams”, working under
the supervision of nurses and as part of the formal
health system [29,30].
Increasing the overall quantity of HRH
Increase in production In reaction to overall HRH
shortages, all governments made plans to increase local
production, sometimes in collaboration with GHIs. In
South Africa, nurses’ colleges which had been closed
down were due to reopen, as part of the new HRH plan,
and production by medical schools was due to increase.
In Angola, 6 public medical schools were established in
2009 in the provinces, in addition to a pre-existing pri-
vate school. In Burundi, production of doctors and
nurses has increased due to an increase in student intake
but also with the creation of private schools, though
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Education.
In general, the capacity of pre-service training institu-
tions was already overstretched before the HIV crisis,
raising concerns about the quality of graduates. These
production increases were sometimes supported by bilat-
eral cooperation: in Lesotho, Irish Aid contributed to
training 150 additional nurses in year 2007 while some
nurses were recruited from Kenya to work in the remote
areas of the country; South Africa has a bilateral agree-
ment with Cuba, to train doctors. PEPFAR supports
HRH production since 2011 (in South Africa and
Mozambique through Medical Education Partnership
Initiative-MEPI- and in Lesotho through Nursing Educa-
tion Partnership Initiative-NEPI-) [31,32].
Mitigation of internal migration induced by inequalities in
salaries
Anti-poaching agreements South Africa was the only
country where evidence of informal policy adopted by a
number of NGOs to stop the poaching of HRH from the
public sector was reported (in one province only). In this
case, NGOs signed an agreement with provincial author-
ities to not recruit public sector HRH from the same
province. However, it did not prevent poaching from
other provinces.
Alignment of NGO salaries to those of public sector
As a result of significant salary inequity between GHI-
funded NGOs and the public sector and the subsequent
brain-drain, salary harmonisation was attempted in most
countries, driven by government or NGOs. In Angola, a
formal and mandatory alignment of NGO salaries with
those of the public sector was introduced via a decree.
As a result, migration of HRH from the public sector to
NGOs was partially reversed. In South Africa, alignment
occurred through informal and local agreements, with
considerable variation between different local govern-
ments. However, such salary alignment was only for clin-
ical or monitoring and evaluation M&E staff (and not
management level staff): some NGOs proactively enquired
about salary levels in the public sector, before setting their
own scales upon recruitment. No formal agreement existed
at higher level, i.e. provincial or national level. In
Mozambique also, in 2006, the Ministry of Health imple-
mented by decree a new policy on salary harmonization
between public health sector and NGO staff seconded to
public health facilities. As a result, personnel from NGOs
are no longer seconded to facilities but give external sup-
port to the public health sector. This policy does not go be-
yond the staff seconded to facilities and as such does not
address income inequalities between external NGOs and
public health sector employees. In Lesotho, NGOs andother implementing partners still have their own salary
scales, independent from the public sector.
Increase in public sector salaries and provision of in-
centives In Burundi, the government was unable to en-
force alignment of NGOs’ salaries to public sector ones,
since this latter were outrageously low. In 2010, eventually,
industrial action forced an increase in public HRH salary
levels, which were aligned to those in neighbouring coun-
tries (i.e. Rwanda). Government also implemented a reten-
tion policy, including financial incentives to public sector
HRH allocated to rural areas. Migration of HRH was then
reversed at the same time as GHIs funding stagnated. In
Lesotho, although salaries remained low, the government
instituted incentives for nurses in the public sector. This
was initially meant for nurses who worked with HIV/AIDS
patients through the support of donor funding. The allow-
ance was subsequently spread to cover all nurses including
those working in hospitals. In Mozambique, the govern-
ment introduced incentives for senior managers to prevent
them from migrating to NGOs in response to evidence of
such internal migration [33]. There was a similar policy in
Burundi, where the financial top-up came out of GHI or
bilateral projects. In South Africa, no evidence of GHI-
funded incentives was found.
Redistribution of incentives at facility-level Burundi
and Lesotho, where some specific categories of staff were
receiving incentives for TB or HIV activities, piloted a
new policy of redistributing those incentives within the
entire facility (a decision of NAC in agreement with
facility-managers in Burundi, a decision of government
in Lesotho). It did not resolve the issue of low salaries
since it resulted in a very small amount per person.
Participation of GHIs in performance-based financing
(Burundi only) From 2010, GFATM-HIV started to sup-
port the national policy on improving HRH working
conditions using a performance-based funding system.
GFATM funding served partly to pay for performance
related to HIV activities. The policy was mainly donor-
driven and donors managed to persuade other signifi-
cant funders to pool available funding.
Discussion
This multi-country analysis shows that all 5 countries
first adopted short term strategies in reaction to the HIV
pandemic and subsequent GHI funding. Those strategies
consisted mainly of using the pool of available HRH to
deliver on the increased volume of HIV tasks, notably
increased numbers on ARVs. These strategies included
task-shifting at facility-level, staff attraction and reten-
tion using incentives, and creation of stand-alone HIV
clinics. To a lesser extent, the pool of HRH was
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cadres of health workers for HIV, use of retired staff,
and secondment of NGO staff to public sector facilities.
On the one hand, these strategies allowed a substantial
increase in the number of patients on ARV within a few
years and fulfilled the primary objective of HIV pro-
grams and funding institutions. However, on the other
hand, these strategies generated tensions: between HIV-
dedicated and general HRH staff, by creating parallel
channels of management and inequities in incomes.
While HIV-dedicated HRH positions were better paid,
these positions were not sustainable and tasks were not
always clearly defined.
Eventually, countries favoured certain short-term HRH
strategies over others, with support from GHIs and
other donors.Short-term strategies: implemented according to GHIs’
common funding conditionality and countries’ specific
contexts
In all countries, funding from GHIs provided a substan-
tial amount of money, usually with a clear conditionality
related to quantitative targets achievement, to kick start
the disbursement of the next financial tranche [21]. This
mechanism of funding was new, placing significant
pressure on country systems and accountability. This
pressure contributed to the creation of parallel HIV
units to enable M&E reporting to GHIs, and to allow
targets to be reached quickly [9]. The necessity to
quickly reach such targets, led to recruitment and train-
ing of HRH, who were retained using incentives. Re-
cruitment however occurred only in a limited number,
due to the restricted funding amount. The creation of
vertical programs was seen to be justified by the sense of
emergency, generated by a series of high level global pol-
icy meetings around 2001–2002 in response to the
growing HIV epidemic in SSA. It probably also served to
demonstrate the effectiveness of certain types of funding
over others, thus fuelling pre-existing competition
between agencies at global level [34]. In addition to the
workload added by HIV care, the combination of pre-
ventative and curative care that GHIs funding was meant
to deliver was new to public sector facilities, and GHIs
proposals were an open call to NGOs and civil society
participation [21]. This partly explains the extensive use
of NGOs (local and international) as short-term strat-
egies to overcome the HRH crisis, either by seconding
their staff to facilities, or by creating stand-alone NGOs
for HIV care. In addition to these explanations above,
which influenced certain types of short-term HRH strat-
egies over more long-term ones, each country reflected
its specificity, according to its historical and political
background.In South Africa, the health system in the pre-GHI era
was already sufficiently organized relatively to the 4
other countries. On the one hand, this allowed second-
ment of NGO staff to public sector facilities, according
to a pre-defined agreement. On the other hand, the very
hierarchical and managerial functioning of the South Af-
rican health system did not immediately allow a clear
task-shifting model to be implemented at facility-level.
NGOs were the most innovative in this domain, testing
several models of care in different facilities.
In Burundi, Lesotho and Mozambique, a parallel
implementing agency, separate from the Ministry of
Health, was created to manage funding from GHIs. Fur-
thermore in Burundi, a separate Ministry of HIV/AIDS
was created. Such separation between health and so-
called HIV sectors, while facilitating the daily manage-
ment in the short-term, created inequities in treatment
between HIV-dedicated and general staff. Also in these 3
countries, the use of CHWs was well accepted, since
rural areas have relied on them for decades, especially
during times of civil war. In Angola, no task-shifting was
employed at facility level, nor were HIV units created,
possibly related to a relatively low prevalence of HIV in
the country.
As challenges and limits of short-term HRH strategies
were revealed, the 5 countries slowly implemented mid
to long-term HRH strategies, such as formalisation of
pilot initiatives (new cadre of health workers, task-
shifting), increase in HRH production, and mitigation of
internal migration of HRH, by increasing public HRH
salaries or by imposing salary alignment on NGOs.
The move of countries towards Health System
Strengthening (HSS), including HRH strengthening
Content of HRH strengthening policy differed, according
to, inter alia, countries’ financial and political resources
and to their resultant degree of dependence on external
donors. Thus, South Africa and Angola could more eas-
ily create new cadres of health workers since these gov-
ernments had sufficient funds to devote to indigenous
training institutions and to increase production of HRH.
Some countries, such as Burundi, did not have the nego-
tiation space to impose a code of conduct on NGOs (i.e.
to set a salary scale). Such policy space depends signifi-
cantly on the extent of reliance on external donors, in-
cluding NGOs. Burundi preferred to increase public
sector salaries instead, which was already a pressing
issue. South Africa managed to impose an anti-poaching
agreement on NGOs and both Angola and South Africa
managed to force NGOs to align their salaries with pub-
lic sector salaries. The Mozambique government forced
to align salaries of NGO staff seconded to public sector
facilities with those in the public sector, but did not have
any control over salaries of NGO staff per se.
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icies, independently of GHIs: in Angola, South Africa and
Burundi, governments started to sign bilateral agreements
with countries which have a surplus of HRH, such as Cuba
(for South Africa, though this pre-dated GHIs), China and
Egypt (Burundi). In all countries except Angola, govern-
ments implemented incentive schemes for rural areas and
sometimes retention schemes for undersubscribed special-
ties, independently of GHIs. In South Africa, the national
department of health introduced increased remuneration
to some categories of public sector HRH to reduce exter-
nal or internal migration (‘occupational specific dispensa-
tion’). Medical interns are also required to perform
community service for 2 years in rural areas. In
Mozambique, health workers working in remote rural
areas are allocated an “isolation subsidy” which increases
with remoteness of the placement. In Lesotho, to increase
rural coverage, public sector nurses are mandatorily sent
to rural areas for a period of 2 years (national policy in
place since before GHIs). Also, some faith-based organiza-
tions, mostly located in rural areas, provided lower salaries
than government and hence are being subsidized by gov-
ernment. The government, with donor support, recruited
nurses from Kenya and Zimbabwe to work in some of
the health facilities in the remote areas. Since 2006, in
Burundi, medical doctors need to spend a 2-year
mandatory period in the public sector, mostly in rural
areas, if they wish to specialise.
What were the drivers for changes in GHI policies?
GHIs and governments increased their collaboration and
GHIs reshuffled their scope of activities in order to fit
the HRH strategies at country-level, following the Paris
declaration and acknowledging the need for aid effect-
iveness and increased coordination. GHIs started to take
HRH pre-service trainings into consideration, although
production was not initially their concern. PEPFAR for
instance launched the MEPI and NEPI in 2010, two pro-
grams aiming at strengthening pre-service training of
HRH [35].
Whether these changes were induced by repeated criti-
cisms of GHI’s targets which were predominantly
aligned to short-term objectives, such as short-courses
and in-service trainings, has been a subject of debate
[36]. Attribution to one or other cause is not possible
and these changes were probably a result of a mixture of
events and influences: GHIs were evaluated through a
pre-set mechanism (i.e. 5-year GFATM evaluations for
GFATM) [21], and further analysed via independent or
commissioned research; many of them emphasized the
fragmenting effects GHIs were having on the health sys-
tem and in particular on HRH [9,11,13,37-39]; external
advocacy towards more focus on HSS and against “AIDS
exceptionalism” also grew, through conferences andpublications; a global HSS debate was complemented by
a focus on long-term HRH production [40].
As countries’ responses to HRH challenges were re-
ported to GHIs, some of these, such as GFATM and Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), with a
participative approach, allowed criticisms to be partly ad-
dressed in a timely manner: GFATM in 2005 introduced a
HSS section to their funding application and GAVI-HSS
was launched in 2006 in pilot countries [41]. Other GHIs,
such as PEPFAR, more rigid in its functioning and admin-
istration, also took into account such criticisms, but at a
slower pace and in a more contained way [22,42]. The slow
shift to more sustainable, indigenous responses towards
HSS and especially HRH strengthening seems therefore a
result of a dialectical relationship between GHI-driven ini-
tiatives and country responses, while the shift has also been
impelled by other objective changes (e.g. availability of gen-
eric drugs). Reduction in global funding is also certainly
forcing countries and GHIs to invest more in long-term ac-
tion, such as pre-service training, better coordination of
training, collaboration across sectors through partnerships
or across programs (TB-HIV, HIV-reproductive health)
and equity in salaries.
HSS and HRH strengthening: what’s in the name?
While GHIs should be commended on their genuine ef-
forts to improve countries’ health system, whether these
HSS plans are really strengthening or just supporting the
health system is a matter of debate [43]. Also, an ideo-
logical struggle seems to have arisen around whether GHIs
have de facto strengthened health systems or had the op-
posite effect [44-48]. Answers to these questions will influ-
ence future HSS directions for GHIs and countries and
caution is needed in interpreting them, since answers
might differ depending on who the assessor is and what
meaning is given to “HSS”. Suggestions for a new orienta-
tion of GHIs have started to emerge based on accumulated
country-based experience and other complex factors [49].
GFATM and GAVI have both included in their fund-
ing programs a stream for HSS, but results have been
mixed: GFATM interrupted its HSS program a year after
its launch, due possibly to a lack of clear definition of
HSS [50]. No clear objective for HSS has been set and
each program has been left to strengthen its own system.
GAVI-HSS programs have not taken into account sus-
tainability: for example in Burundi, the GAVI-HSS funds
were used inter alia to pay for fuel and salaries for
drivers, in order to transport pregnant women to referral
hospitals. Also, initially, an item for HRH capacity
strengthening existed in all GFATM proposals, but these
were mainly interpreted as in-service training by recipi-
ents or used to hire extra staff, without a clear sustain-
ability plan. Some of these HRH are now left without a
secure position since GHI funding has shrunk.
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ples of PEPFAR platforms for strengthening the sustain-
ability of HRH in the countries [22] though the majority
of funding is still clearly earmarked for expanding HIV
management and HIV research capacity [31]. The non-
coordination between GHIs at global level, impacting
negatively coordination at country level, has also
emerged as a common feature to all countries, in our
example of HRH strategies. In an attempt to respond in
a coordinated way to health system challenges, a project
to develop a joint HSS funding platform between the
World Bank, GAVI and GFATM was launched in 2009
[51,52]. However, the project has stalled, showing, inter
alia, the extent to which an agreement on HSS objec-
tives and visions is difficult to obtain [53].
Our study has some limitations.
Qualitative data were collected in a cross-sectional,
manner with different time-periods (Table 1), rising issue
of temporal bias while comparing findings.
Quantitative data proved difficult or impossible to com-
pare, since HRH categories were not the same across
countries, and data were not consistently available or
complete for the same time periods. The numbers of HRH
specific to HIV were not available; nor were the distribu-
tion of HRH according to NGOs/private/public sector.
Hence, quantitative data were provided solely for an illus-
trative purpose and do not serve as a basis for a rigorous
statistical comparison. Information on non-response rates
to requests for interviews was not available consistently
across the 5 countries and was therefore not presented.
This could have contributed to an ascertainment bias.
Some important institutions such as professional
councils were not interviewed at first, or, even when
solicited, did not reply (Health Professionals Council in
South Africa). This constitutes a limitation given the role
that professional councils play in HRH policies.
Particular policies adopted to counteract a specific ef-
fect induced by GHIs were difficult to distinguish from
more general policies adopted by the government to ad-
dress the overall HRH crisis, which pre-dated GHIs.
Finally, given the open nature of the health system, at-
tribution of changes to the influence of GHIs or activ-
ists/researchers or countries is an impossible task (and
probably not useful). The truth probably lies somewhere
between these different interpretations, where stream of
influences mix with experiences and beliefs and create a
general direction that actors tend to follow and refine
through compromise and consensus. This last point re-
fers directly to the inherent complexity of the field of
health policy and system research, constantly influenced
by political and social dynamics [54].
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study
provides a unique insight into the complex and slow
process of policy shift which has occurred in fivecountries, between 2007 and 2011, using the example of
HRH policies and their evolution in response to GHIs
and related HIV activities. Collectively, the findings point
to some consistent patterns and effects of GHIs on HRH
policies and the workforce, as well as some context-
specific differences, across these five southern African
countries.
Conclusion
This cross-country paper has shown the differences in
countries’ strategies, in response to a common challenge,
illustrating the extent to which factors inherent to coun-
tries are influential. These findings provide further evi-
dence of the importance of country led policies in HSS
[55]. Countries are best positioned to assume responsibil-
ity on how to best use the global funding available for the
purpose of HSS. HSS proposals should be scrutinized
carefully according to each country’s context and broader
factors, since the “one size fits all” strategy has proven its
inefficiency and sometimes its counter-effectiveness in the
long-run. A preliminary impact assessment might be one
mechanism, to anticipate any unexpected outcome due to
a particular type of funding/policies on the general health
system [56]. There is also an urgent need to better define
what exactly “health system strengthening” means for do-
nors, for recipients, but most importantly for health sys-
tem users, i.e. for patients.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
AP, TM, EM, RB, JC, IC, TM, BC carried out part of the fieldwork. DS, BC, WVD,
RB, GD, UL participated in the study conception and in the design of the
study. JC drafted the manuscript. JC, AP, WVD, LVL, TM, EM, RB, TM, BC, GD,
RB, IC, DS, UL participated to data analysis, interpretation and edited the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This study was funded by a European Commission project “GHIs in Africa”
(grant number INCO-CT-2006-032371).
We thank Ms Renata Mares for her useful comments to the paper during its
design.
Author details
1School of Public Health, Faculty of Community Health Sciences, University
of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa. 2Unit of International Public
Health and Biostatistics, Instituto de Higiene e Medicina Tropical, CMDT,
WHO Collaborating Centre for Health Workforce Policy and Planning,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal. 3Eduardo Mondlane
University, Maputo, Mozambique. 4Faculty of Health Sciences, National
University of Lesotho, Maseru, Lesotho. 5Department of Public Health,
Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium. 6Department of
Epidemiology and Public Health Medicine, Division of Population Health
Sciences, Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Received: 24 June 2013 Accepted: 25 September 2013
Published: 25 October 2013
References
1. Bernstein M, Sessions M: A trickle or a flood: commitments and disbursement for
HIV/AIDS from the global fund, PEPFAR, and the World Bank’ s multi-country AIDS
program (MAP). Washington DC, USA: Center for Global Development; 2007:1–26.
Cailhol et al. Globalization and Health 2013, 9:52 Page 13 of 14
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/522. Brugha R: Global health initiatives and public health policy. Int
Encyclopedia Public Health 2008, 3:72–81.
3. Komatsu R, Korenromp EL, Low-Beer D, Watt C, Dye C, Steketee RW, Nahlen BL,
Lyerla R, Garcia-Calleja JM, Cutler J, Schwartlander B: Lives saved by
global fund supported HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria programs:
estimation approach and results between 2003 and end-2007.
BMC Infect Dis 2010, 10:109.
4. Bendavid E, Bhattacharya J: The President ’s emergency plan for AIDS relief
in Africa : an evaluation of outcomes. Ann Intern Med 2009, 150:688–695.
5. Working together for health. Geneva: The World Health Report of the World
Health Organization; 2006.
6. Hirschhorn LR, Oguda L, Fullem A, Dreesch N, Wilson P: Estimating health
workforce needs for antiretroviral therapy in resource-limited settings.
Human Resour Health 2006, 4:1–16.
7. Van Damme W, Kober K, Kegels G: Scaling-up antiretroviral treatment in
Southern African countries with human resource shortage: how will
health systems adap? Soc Sci Med 2008, 66:2108–2121.
8. Mtonya B, Chizimbi S: Systemwide Effects of the Global Fund in Malawi: Final
Report. Bethesda, USA: The Partners for Health ReformPlus project, Abt
Associates Inc.; 2006:1–54.
9. Biesma RG, Brugha R, Harmer A, Walsh A, Spicer N, Walt G: The effects of
global health initiatives on country health systems: a review of the
evidence from HIV / AIDS control. Health Policy Plan 2009, 24(4):239–252.
10. Brugha R, Simbaya J, Walsh A, Dicker P, Ndubani P: How HIV / AIDS
scale-up has impacted on non- HIV priority services in Zambia.
BMC Public Health 2010, 10:540.
11. Hanefeld J, Musheke M: What impact do Global Health Initiatives have on
human resources for antiretroviral treatment roll-out ? A qualitative
policy analysis of implementation processes in Zambia. Hum Resour
Health 2009, 7:1–13.
12. Oomman N, Wendt D, Droggitis C: Zeroing. Washington, DC: AIDS Donors
and Africa’s Health Workforce; 2010:1–72.
13. World Health Organization Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative
Group: An assessment of interactions between global health initiatives
and country health systems. Lancet 2009, 373:2137–2169.
14. Human Resources for Health: Overcoming the Crisis. Joint Learning Initiative.
Boston, USA: Harvard University; 2004.
15. Samb B, Celletti F, Holloway J, Van Damme W, De Cock KM, Dybul M: Rapid
expansion of the health workforce in response to the HIV epidemic.
N Engl J Med 2007, 357:2510–2514.
16. Human resources for health strategy 2012 to 2017. South Africa: National
Department of Health; 2012.
17. Politique de développement des ressources humaines. Burundi: Ministère de la
Santé; 2010.
18. Scheffler RM, Mahoney CB, Fulton BD, Dal Poz MR, Preker AS: Estimates of
health care professional shortages in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015.
Health affairs 2009, 28:w849–w862.
19. Wildshut A: Doctors in the public service: too few for too many.
HSRC Review 2010, 8(4).
20. Bedelu M, Ford N, Hilderbrand K, Reuter H: Implementing antiretroviral
therapy in rural communities: the Lusikisiki model of decentralized HIV/
AIDS care. J Infect Dis 2007, 196(Suppl 3):S464–8.
21. GFATM: The Framework Document. Geneva, Switzerland: The GFATM;
2001:1–22.
22. Institute of Medicine: Evaluation of PEPFAR. Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press; 2013.
23. Tyrrell AK, Russo G, Dussault G, Ferrinho P: Costing the scaling-up of
human resources for health: lessons from Mozambique and Guinea
Bissau. Human Resour Health 2010, 8:1–10.
24. Burundi: “Die-in” to protest lack of HIV care. http://www.irinnews.org/Report/
92363/BURUNDI-Die-in-to-protest-lack-of-HIV-care.
25. Georgeu D, Colvin CJ, Lewin S, Fairall L, Bachmann MO, Uebel K,
Zwarenstein M, Draper B, Bateman ED: Implementing nurse-initiated and
managed antiretroviral treatment (NIMART) in South Africa: a qualitative
process evaluation of the STRETCH trial. Implementation Sci 2012, 7:1–13.
26. Fairall L, Bachmann MO, Lombard C, Timmerman V, Uebel K, Zwarenstein M,
Boulle A, Georgeu D, Colvin CJ, Lewin S, Faris G, Cornick R, Draper B,
Tshabalala M, Kotze E, Van Vuuren C, Steyn D, Chapman R, Bateman E: Task
shifting of antiretroviral treatment from doctors to primary-care nurses
in South Africa (STRETCH): a pragmatic, parallel, cluster-randomised trial.
Lancet 2012, 380:889–898.27. Dreyer A: Clinical associate programme: understanding this new level of
Health Care worker. Johannesburg: Public Health Association of South Africa
annual conference; 2011.
28. Introduction of a New Job/work Level of Clinical Associate. South Africa:
Natinal Department of Health; 2010.
29. Pillay Y, Baron P: The implementation of PHC re-engineering in South Africa.
East London: Public Health Association of South Africa annual conference;
2010:1–6.
30. Support for district health plans and their implementation. District Health
System News 2011, 3:1–7.
31. Medical Education Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Fogarty International Center
of the national Institutes of Health; 2011.
32. Dohrn J: Nursing Education Partnership Initiative (NEPI ). NYC, USA: ICAP,
Columbia School of Public Health; 2011.
33. Sherr K, Mussa A, Chilundo B, Gimbel S, Pfeiffer J, Hagopian A, Gloyd S:
Brain drain and health workforce distortions in Mozambique. PloS one
2012, 7:e35840.
34. Horton R: Offline: the struggle for leadership. Lancet 2012,
380(Dec 8):1977–1978.
35. Launch of the Frontline Healthcare Workers Coalition. http://blogs.state.gov/
2012/01/article/launch-frontline-healthcare-workers-coalition.
36. Vujicic M, Weber SE, Nikolic IA, Atun R, Kumar R: An analysis of GAVI, the
Global Fund and World Bank support for human resources for health in
developing countries. Health Policy Plann 2012, 27:649–657.
37. Walsh A, Ndubani P, Simbaya J, Dicker P, Brugha R: Task sharing in Zambia:
HIV service scale-up compounds the human resource crisis. BMC Health
Serv Res 2010, 10:272.
38. Brugha R, Kadzandira J, Simbaya J, Dicker P, Mwapasa V, Walsh A: Health
workforce responses to global health initiatives funding : a comparison
of Malawi and Zambia. Hum Resour Health 2010, 8:19.
39. Global HIV / AIDS Initiatives and Human Resources for Health in Zambia. GHIN
policy brief; 2009. October.
40. Frenk J, Chen L, Bhutta Z, Cohen J, Crisp N, Evans T, Fineberg H, Garcia P,
Ke Y, Kelley P, Kistnasamy B, Meleis A, Naylor D, Pablos-Mendez A, Reddy S,
Scrimshaw S, Sepulveda J, Serwadda D, Zurayk H: Health professionals for
a new century: transforming education to strengthen health systems in
an interdependent world. Lancet 2010, 376:1923–1958.
41. Galichet B, Goeman L, Hill PS, Essengue MS, Hammami N, Porignon D,
Kadama P: Linking programmes and systems : lessons from the GAVI health
systems strengthening window. Trop Med Int Health 2010, 15:208–215.
42. Tangcharoensathien V, Patcharanarumol W: Global health initiatives :
opportunities or challenges? Health Policy and Planning 2010, 25:103–105.
43. Chee G, Pielemeier N, Lion A, Connor C: Why differentiating between
health system support and health system strengthening is needed. Int J
Health Plann Mgmt 2013, 28(1):85–94.
44. Duber HC, Coates TJ, Szekeres G, Kaji AH, Lewis RJ: Is there an association
between PEPFAR funding and improvement in national health indicators
in Africa? A retrospective study. J Int AIDS Soc 2010, 13:21.
45. El-sadr WM, De Cock KM: Health systems exist for real people. J Acquir
Immune Defic Syndr 2009, 52(1):S1–S2.
46. Palen J, El-sadr W, Phoya A, Imtiaz R, Einterz R, Quain E, Blandford J, Bouey P,
Lion A: PEPFAR, health system strengthening, and promoting sustainability
and country ownership. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr 2012, 60(Suppl 3):113–119.
47. Car J, Paljärvi T, Car M, Kazeem A, Majeed A, Atun R: Negative health system
effects of Global Fund’s investments in AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria from
2002 to 2009: systematic review. J R Soc Med Sh Rep 2012, 3:1–14.
48. Walensky RP, Kuritzkes DR: The impact of the president’s emergency plan
for AIDS relief ( PEPfAR ) beyond HIV and why it remains essential.
CID 2010, 50:272–275.
49. Buse K, Tanaka S: Global public-private health partnerships : lessons
learned from ten years of experience and evaluation. Int Dent J 2011,
61(Suppl. 2):2–10.
50. Bertolone M: Decision-making in global health initiatives: the example of the
discontinuation of health systems strengthening proposals by the global fund.
London, UK: The London School of Economics and Political Science;
2007:1–30.
51. England R: The GAVI, Global Fund, and World Bank joint funding
platform. Lancet 2009, 374:1595–1596.
52. Hill PS, Vermeiren P, Miti K, Ooms G, Van Damme W: The health systems
funding platform: is this where we thought we were going?
Globalization Health 2011, 7:1–16.
Cailhol et al. Globalization and Health 2013, 9:52 Page 14 of 14
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/9/1/5253. Brown SS, Sen K, Decoster K: The health systems funding platform and
world bank legacy: the gap between rhetoric and reality.
Globalization Health 2013, 9:1–7.
54. Gilson L, Hanson K, Sheikh K, Agyepong IA, Ssengooba F, Bennett S:
Building the field of health policy and systems research: social science
matters. PLoS Med 2011, 8:1–6.
55. Borisch B: GHIs and the new dichotomy in health systems. J Public Health
Policy 2010, 31:100–109.
56. Swanson RC, Bongiovanni A, Bradley E, Murugan V, Sundewall J, Betigeri A,
Nyonator F, Cattaneo A, Harless B, Ostrovsky A: Toward a consensus on
guiding principles for health systems strengthening. PLoS Med 2010, 7:1–6.
doi:10.1186/1744-8603-9-52
Cite this article as: Cailhol et al.: Analysis of human resources for health
strategies and policies in 5 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, in response
to GFATM and PEPFAR-funded HIV-activities. Globalization and Health
2013 9:52.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
